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The Making of International Agreements: a Reappraisal of Congressional
Involvement
Abstract
Although the constitution implies that the primary responsibility in the making of foreign policy resides in the
Executive Branch, the Congress shares several important powers in this area.' Among these is the prerogative
to join in the making of international commitments, as expressed in the treaty-making provisions of the
Constitution.2 Lately, however, critics have argued that the foreign policy powers of Congress have eroded
drastically through unilateral action taken by the Executive Branch. The criticism contends, first, that the form
of international commitments has changed in recent years. Increasingly, the President has used executive
agreements, proclamations, or other unilateral instruments to circumvent the involvement of the Congress.3 A
second and related criticism centers on the content of the various international agreements. Even when the
Congress has been involved in the agreement-making process, the issues with which it has dealt have been
substantively less important than those handled unilaterally by the Executive. According to this view, for
example, the making of military agreements has tended to take the form of executive agreements-thus
excluding congressional participation-while the making of taxation agreements or radio regulations is
presented to the Congress in the forms of treaties.
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 The Making of
 International Agreements:
 a Reappraisal
 of
 Congressional Involvement
 LOCH JOHNSON
 JAMES M. MCCORMICK
 A LTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION implies that the primary responsi-
 bility in the making of foreign policy resides in the Executive
 Branch, the Congress shares several important powers in this area.'
 Among these is the prerogative to join in the making of interna-
 tional commitments, as expressed in the treaty-making provisions of
 * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1976 Annual Meeting
 of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois. The authors
 would like to thank the Ohio University Research Committee for a grant to
 support the original data collection; the Department of Political Science, Iowa
 State University, for computer time and clerical support; Leena S. Johnson,
 Carol Gertner, Alison Jessen, and Debbie Nellis for their painstaking care in
 handling an almost overwhelming data collection and coding task; Thomas L.
 Brewer and Jorgen S. Rasmussen for helpful criticism of an earlier draft; and,
 the Department of State, Office of Legal Advisor, for responding quickly and
 courteously to several information requests. Any errors in this study, however,
 are the sole responsibility of the authors.
 1 On the constitutional relationship between congressional and executive
 power in foreign affairs, see Louis Henkin, Foreign Agairs and the Constitution
 (Mineola: Foundation Press, 1972).
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 the Constitution.2 Lately, however, critics have argued that the
 foreign policy powers of Congress have eroded drastically through
 unilateral action taken by the Executive Branch. The criticism
 contends, first, that the form of international commitments has
 changed in recent years. Increasingly, the President has used
 executive agreements, proclamations, or other unilateral instruments
 to circumvent the involvement of the Congress.3 A second and re-
 lated criticism centers on the content of the various international
 agreements. Even when the Congress has been involved in the
 agreement-making process, the issues with which it has dealt have
 been substantively less important than those handled unilaterally by
 the Executive. According to this view, for example, the making
 of military agreements has tended to take the form of executive
 agreements-thus excluding congressional participation-while the
 making of taxation agreements or radio regulations is presented to
 the Congress in the forms of treaties.4 An exasperated Senate For-
 2 Article II, sec. 2 of the Constitution states, "The President shall be Com-
 mander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. . . . He shall
 have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
 Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
 nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
 Ambassadors. . . ."
 3 Among many who make this argument are Louis Fisher, The President and
 Congress: Power and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1972), 42-47; Arthur
 Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
 1973), 310-319; J. William Fulbright, The Crippled Giant (New York: Ran-
 dom House, Vintage Books, 1972), 216-227; James A. Robinson, Congress and
 Foreign Policy Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative (re-
 vised ed.; Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), 11; and Stan A.
 Taylor, "Congressional Resurgence" in Problems of American Foreign Policy,
 ed. Martin B. Hickman (2nd ed.; Beverly Hills: Benziger Bruce and Glencoe,
 Inc., Glencoe Press, 1975), 106-118. For other discussions on executive-con-
 gressional relations in foreign policy-making, see Robert A. Dahl, Congress and
 Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950); Ronald C.
 Moe and Steven C. Teel, "Congress as Policy Maker: A Necessary Re-
 appraisal" in The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy Making, ed. Douglas M. Fox
 (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1971),
 157-160; and Amy M. Gilbert, Executive Agreements and Treaties, 1946-1973
 (New York: Thomas-Newell, 1973).
 4 The reference is a paraphrase of Senator William Fulbright's comments in
 The Crippled Giant in which he contrasted the content of treaties and execu-
 tive agreements for 1954 and 1968 (224). Others who have presented similar
 views are quoted in Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, 313. For example,
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 eign Relations Committee concluded in 1969, "We have come close
 to reversing the traditional distinction between the treaty as the
 instrument of a major commitment and the executive agreement as
 the instrument of a minor one."5 This research note examines the
 validity of this criticism by surveying systematically all non-
 classified U.S. foreign policy commitments from 1946 to 1972.6
 Specifically, we seek to determine the extent to which Congress and
 the Executive Branch have participated in the making of interna-
 tional agreements over the 27 year period. We explore, also, the
 question of whether the involvement of Congress or the Executive
 in agreement-making depends upon the content of the subject
 matter being negotiated. Are trivial matters left to the legislature
 while serious issues, like military policy, remain the special preserve
 of the Executive? Finally, we evaluate the extent to which the
 form and content of international agreements have differed among
 the five post-World War II Presidents.
 THE DATA
 Data for this study were compiled from various source materials
 Senator Clifford Case is cited as having said, "We are not put in the Senate
 to deal only with treaties on copyrights, extradition, stamp collections and
 minor questions of protocol. If that is the meaning of the Constitution, then I
 think the Founding Fathers wasted their time." Fulbright is also quoted.
 "The Senate is asked to convene solemnly to approve by a two-thirds vote a
 treaty to preserve cultural artifacts in a friendly neighboring country. At the
 same time, the Chief Executive is moving American military men and material
 around the globe like so many pawns in a chess game."
 5 See Senate Report 91-129, "National Commitments," 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
 1964, April 16, 1964, 28. Also cited in Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency,
 313.
 6 Classified agreements are not included in this analysis. Although the exact
 number of these agreements is not known for the period of our data, we do
 know that some 63 agreements have been sent to the Congress under an in-
 junction of secrecy between the time that the Case Act was passed (August
 1972) and March 1977. A senior staff member of the House International
 Relations Committee estimates that from five to ten percent of all agreements
 are secret and mainly deal with military policy (Interview June 1974, Wash-
 ington, D. C.). In any case, the classified nature of the agreements prevents
 their inclusion in the analysis. Also, since no record exists of the various verbal
 agreements between the United States and other nations, this analysis must
 perforce exclude these informal understandings as well.
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 on international agreements.7 Over 6,000 agreements were signed
 by the United States between January 1, 1946 and December 31,
 19728. These agreements were collected and coded according to
 form and content using the following guidelines. First, the form
 of each international commitment was determined on the basis of
 the legal authority claimed by the Department of State for signing
 each agreement. Collapsing the categories established by the State
 Department Office of Legal Advisor, three basic forms were identi-
 fied: (1) agreements based in whole or in part upon the authority
 and power of the President under the Constitution (executive
 agreements); (2) agreements approved by the treaty process, or
 made within the framework of treaty provisions without prior or
 subsequent legislation (treaties); and (3) agreements made pur-
 suant to congressional legislation (statutory agreements) .9 Second,
 7 See the United States Statutes At Large which lists treaties and other inter-
 national agreements entered into prior to 1950; the compilation entitled United
 States Treaties and Other International Agreements which covers agreements
 entered into force on or after January 1, 1950; the numbered pamphlet copies
 of international agreements in the Treaties and Other International Acts Series;
 and the series entitled Digest of United States Practice in International Law.
 Each of these documents is printed by the Government Printing Office, Wash-
 ington, D. C.
 8 Technically, the signing of an international agreement does not always
 bring it into force. Instead, the signing may be only a preliminary act. For
 example, a treaty may be signed but never ratified; that is, it may never come
 *to bind the parties. However, the date of initial signing is used in this analy-
 sis, rather than the date of effectiveness, since we are interested here primarily
 in the initiation of international commitments by the United States-and especi-
 ally the differences in initiation by the Executive and the Congress.
 9 The data source for this classification of the agreements was International
 Agreements Other than Treaties, 1946-1968: a list with Citation of their Legal
 Basis, Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs,
 January 10, 1969, mimeographed, supplemented with an addendum through
 April 1972. Department of State opinions for May through December 1972
 were obtained from telephone interviews with the Office of the Legal Advisor
 in January 1976.
 Acceptance of the classification decisions reached by the Department of
 State poses some problems. The State Department may have made judgmental
 errors which have been incorporated into this analysis. A potentially more
 serious problem is that the State Department might have interpreted improp-
 erly, on some occasions, the basis of authority for various agreements-perhaps
 even broadly deriving statutory authority for agreements beyond the original
 intent of congressional legislation. These are important matters requiring
 separate and close attention. We do not attempt here to evaluate the accuracy
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 the content of the agreements was determined by examining their
 subject matter. While in each year international agreements cover
 a wide range of issues, the content areas are sufficiently the same
 that some general categories can be established. Eleven categories
 were identified and collapsed into five broad policy areas:10
 of the Department of State classification decisions. They are amply docu-
 mented and await an assessment by legal scholars. In the meanwhile, the
 State Department opinions remain a particularly authoritative source regarding
 the degree to which various administrations have claimed constitutionally-
 grounded executive authority for agreement-making.
 We should emphasize again that our classifying agreements as executive ap-
 plies only to those in which the President invokes his constitutionally-derived
 power. Those agreements that are made by the Executive pursuant to con-
 gressional legislation are classified into the statutory category. While this
 distinction is generally recognized by scholars in the area, the tendency has
 been to place executive and statutory agreements under the same "executive
 agreement" (non-treaty) grouping.
 10 The eleven content categories follow. Examples of agreements coded in
 each category are presented after each entry.
 (1) Military: agreements on weapons systems; bases; military assistance;
 military alliances; training of military personnel; military supplies (such as
 naval vessels); arms control.
 (2) Trade and Economics: agreements on commerce; agricultural com-
 modities; trademarks; taxes on income and property; finance and debt re-
 scheduling; economic assistance; fishing and whaling.
 (3) Transportation: agreements on airlines and shipping; prevention of
 incidents on and over the high seas; tolls for international waterways.
 (4) Communications: postal agreements; television and radio facilities;
 satellite telemetry and telecommand stations.
 (5) Health: sanitation agreements; disease prevention; cooperation in medi-
 cal science and public health.
 (6) Passports: agreements on passports and visas; immigration quotas;
 free-entry for diplomatic personnel.
 (7) Education: agreements on educational exchanges and special educa-
 tional programs.
 (8) Cultural-Technical: agreements on cultural exchanges; Peace Corps;
 scientific and technical co-operation; copyrights; tracking stations; environ-
 mental protection; energy (including atomic); protection of migratory animals;
 disaster assistance; weather stations; space co-operation; remote sensing for
 earth surveys.
 (9) Diplomatic Recognition and Relations: agreements recognizing the
 existence of other nations; matters relating to foreign service personnel; inter-
 national boundary disputes; exchange of official government publications; trans-
 fer of territory.
 (10) Claims: agreements on repayment for expropriated property during
 time of peace.
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 (1) Military
 (2) Economic
 (3) Cultural-Technical
 (4) Transportation and Communication
 (5) Diplomatic
 The over 6,000 agreements analyzed here are, of course, not of
 equal rank; some deal with the reduction of passport visa fees,
 others with major defense alliances. Comparisons based strictly on
 numbers have their limitations. While ultimately we hope to ex-
 tend the research into qualitative comparisons, at this stage we
 shall focus only on the frequency of the form and content of Ameri-
 can commitments since 1946.
 FINDINGS
 The results of this analysis disclose that the overwhelming per-
 centage-almost 87 percent-of all United States agreements be-
 tween 1946 and 1972 have been statutory. By contrast, executive
 agreements and treaties account for only 7 percent and 6 percent,
 respectively, of all agreements in this same period. These aggre-
 gate figures strongly suggest that Congress has not been left out of
 the agreement process; indeed it has participated in the vast ma-
 jority of them. At the same time, though, the data confirm the
 notion that the treaty has been replaced as the official instrument
 of foreign policy commitment." But again, in contrast to the con-
 ventional wisdom, treaties have been replaced not by executive
 (11) War Claims: restitution of property seized during war; matters re-
 lating to military occupation.
 These eleven categories were then collapsed in the following way:
 ( 1) Military
 (2) Economic (Trade and Economics)
 (3) Cultural-Technical (including Education and Health)
 (4) Transportation and Communication
 (5) Diplomatic (including Passports, Claims, and War Claims)
 Finally, it is important to note that each agreement was placed in only one
 category for the analysis.
 11 In the early years of the nation, the treaty was the predominant instru-
 ment of foreign policy. By the late 1800s and the early 1900s, the treaty gave
 way to other forms of commitments. For some historical data on the use of
 treaties and executive agreements (although the latter is based on a different
 definition from the one used here), see Fisher, The President and Congress:
 Power and Policy, 45.
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 TABLE 1
 FORM OF U.S. FOREIGN AGREEMENTS BY ADMINISTRATION, 1946-1972
 Administration
 Form Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon
 Executive
 Agreements 10.7%o 5.5%/ 3.8%l 8.1%l 8.2%
 Statutory
 Agreements 79.5 89.2 92.6 86.4 87.3
 Treaties 9.8 5.3 3.7 5.5 4.6
 (N) (1316) (1903) (821) (1135) (833)
 a Entries are percentages based on column N's shown at bottom. Some
 percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding errors.
 agreements; but rather, by statutory agreements-instruments in-
 volving both Houses of Congress as well as the Executive Branch.
 The Form of International Agreements
 Some fluctuations in form have occurred during the post-war
 period. For example, statutory agreements varied from 67.1 per-
 cent of all agreements in 1949 to 95.1 percent in 1962; treaties from
 1.5 percent in 1962 to 15.8 percent in 1949; and executive agree-
 ments from 2.3 percent in 1961 to 19.9 percent in 1948. On bal-
 ance, though, no shift in the rank-order of the major instruments
 has taken place: statutory agreements have always been used most
 often as a method of committing the United States in foreign affairs,
 executive agreements rarely, and the treaty process the least of all.
 A similar conclusion results when we analyze the use of these
 different forms by administration. We fail to detect any dramatic
 differences among the five Presidents (Table 1). Each (except
 President Truman) used the statutory agreement over 86 percent
 of the time for the formal conduct of American foreign policy.
 Even President Truman, who relied least upon this instrument, still
 used it 80 percent of the time. The major differences were that
 President Truman was most inclined to use executive agreements
 and President Kennedy was least inclined. From the Truman Ad-
 ministration through the Nixon Administration, the use of treaties
 has declined.
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 TABLE 2
 FoRM OF U.S. FoREIrN AGREEMENTS BY CoNTzNT AREA, 1946-1972
 Content
 Transportation Cultural
 Form Military Economic Communication Technical Diplomatic
 Executive
 Agreements 12.0%' 4.3% 5.6% 3.5% 28.9%
 Statutory
 Agreements 84.5 88.9 85.1 93.2 58.0
 Treaties 3.5 6.8 9.3 3.3 13.1
 (N) (1158) (2235) (623) (1572) (381)
 - Entries are percentages based on column N's shown at bottom. Thirty-
 nine agreements, representing .6% of the total, were classified as "other" for
 content and are not shown in the table.
 In sum, the argument that the form of international agreements
 has shifted to one which excludes the Congress is not supported by
 the evidence in this study. Moreover, when we examined the data
 over time and by administration, this conclusion was not altered.
 The Content of International Agreements
 The use of the three major forms of agreements within each of
 the five content or issue-areas is presented in Table 2. Statutory
 agreements are once again the dominant form, regardless of the
 content of the international agreement. Only in the case of diplo-
 matic content does the percentage of statutory agreements drop
 below 80 percent. The argument that the Congress has been sys-
 tematically excluded from particular policy areas is not supported
 by these data. Differences across content areas do exist, however,
 for executive agreements and treaties. As Table 2 illustrates,
 executive agreements have been used most frequently for military
 and diplomatic policy, and considerably less often for economic,
 transportation/communication, and cultural/technical policies. In
 contrast, treaties have been used most frequently for diplomatic
 and transportation/communication policy, less often for economic
 policy, and least often for military and cultural/technical policy.
 In comparing policy differences within each form, then, these
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 results lend some credence to the proposition that vital issues like
 military commitments have often been handled through a form
 removed from congressional participation.'2 Seemingly less critical
 matters, however, such as cultural/technical, economic, and trans-
 portation/communication policy have been dealt with in a way
 which allowed congressional action. While the proposition thus has
 some accuracy, it should not be exaggerated in light of the large
 number of statutory agreements across all issue-areas.13
 Presidents and International Agreements
 Have the five Presidents differed significantly in the form and
 content of agreements signed during their respective terms? And,
 especially, to what extent have Presidents differed in their use of
 executive agreements for all content areas? When we examine the
 form and content of agreements for each of the five post-World
 War II administrations, we find little difference from the aggregate
 conclusions presented earlier. For each administration, the statu-
 tory pact dominates the agreement-making process. With the ex-
 ception of diplomatic policies, rarely does the percentage of statu-
 tory agreements fall below 80 percent in any policy area. For the
 other two forms, no clearly notable increase or decrease in their
 usage occurs across the five administrations. Instead, the fluctua-
 tions in the use of treaties and executive agreements have remained
 within relatively narrow ranges.
 From this consistency across administrations emerges only one
 particularly significant pattern that is germane to this discussion:
 the persistent use of the executive agreement for military and diplo-
 matic issues. With the exception of President Kennedy, all the
 Chief Executives have used executive agreements to a much greater
 12 The War Powers Resolution of 1973 allows the Congress to monitor more
 closely the use of executive discretion in this area. Similarly, recent legislation
 (the Nelson-Bingham Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act) has
 obtained congressional review on foreign arms sales. To date, however, no
 legislation has been enacted which allows congressional approval of all execu-
 tive agreements.
 13 If we were to assume that all secret executive agreements (estimated at
 an additional 10 percent of the total) were military, the total percentage of
 military executive agreements would still not be much higher than 30 percent.
 Such a result would only reinforce our argument about military policy being
 more subject to executive discretion, but it would not alter the basic finding
 regarding the dominance of the statutory agreement, even in this issue-area.
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 extent for military and diplomatic affairs than for the other major
 policy areas. Presidents Truman and Johnson had the highest per-
 centages of executive agreements for military pacts (15.5 percent
 and 25.4 percent, respectively), with Presidents Eisenhower and
 Nixon (9.1 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively) close behind.
 In the diplomatic area, the percentage of executive agreements used
 by each of the administrations was even higher; three of the Presi-
 dents (Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson) used executive agree-
 ments for 30 percent or more of their diplomatic transactions.
 On balance, then, these results suggest that the Presidents have
 differed in the extent to which they have participated unilaterally
 in the making of formal foreign policy commitments-though the
 differences have not been extreme. Moreover, it is also apparent
 that the content area of an agreement affects the degree of presi-
 dential activism, with military and diplomatic issues the most prom-
 inent areas of Executive discretion. Furthermore, our data suggest
 the absence of any trend toward an increase in Executive power
 in international agreement-making; in this sense, we find little sup-
 port for the contention that presidential power has continued to
 aggrandize in this area of foreign policy-making.14
 CONCLUSION
 Although the central empirical finding in this research note indi-
 cates a greater procedural role for Congress in agreement-making
 than conventional wisdom suggests, it would be premature to con-
 clude that Congress plays a large substantive role. Instead, our
 findings demonstrate only that members of Congress have been
 asked to give, and have given, an official green light to the vast
 majority of overseas commitments-most initiated by the Executive
 Branch. Whether or not the Congress always knew precisely what
 it approved, though, is quite a different question. In fact, the
 extant literature, as well as our own interviews and impressions,15
 14 Such a conclusion should not imply that presidential discretion is already
 too large or too small, but only that the charge of its continued growth is not
 consistent with the data presented here.
 15 In June 1974, the authors conducted a series of interviews with members
 and staff of the House International Relations Committee and the Senate
 Foreign Relations Committee as well as with State Department personnel in
 the Office of Treaty Affairs.
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 suggests that the legislative branch is deficient in the substantive
 area, despite its considerable procedural involvement in the ap-
 proval of international commitments. A separate data collection
 and analysis, however, would be required to explore fully this sub-
 stantive concern.16
 16 For an attempt to assess the substantive and procedural involvement of
 the Congress in one important policy area, see Loch Johnson and James M.
 McCormick "Foreign Policy by Executive Fiat," Foreign Policy, no. 28 (Fall
 1977), 117-138.
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